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Transitive Counterparty Risk
and Financial Contracts
Manuel A. Utset†
INTRODUCTION
Before the Great Recession of 2007–2009 (the Great
Recession), Congress, regulators, and many commentators had
assumed (often implicitly) that the best way to prevent financial
crises and contagion was to ensure that each financial
institution subject to regulatory oversight—primarily depository
institutions, such as commercial banks—remained financially
sound. To accomplish this, Congress required depository
institutions insured by the FDIC to retain sufficient amounts of
capital (to avoid bank runs and insolvency) and to subject
themselves to active (often on-site) oversight by the FDIC.
The Great Recession exposed a number of flaws with
extant financial regulations. First, many financial institutions
acted just like banks but escaped banking regulation by not
accepting deposits subject to FDIC insurance. Many of these
“shadow banks,” as well as regulated banks (collectively,
“financial institutions”), failed or received bailout funds from the
government. This occurred not because they became insolvent
but because they suffered from liquidity problems—they were
unable to continue raising capital to finance their ongoing
operations, or they were forced to pay much higher returns to
entice investors to make investments. Second, these failing
financial institutions were parties to thousands or, in some
cases, millions of financial contracts,1 many of which were highly
complex and not well understood by regulators, rating agencies,
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1
For example, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, it had nearly
one million open derivatives contracts, a large number of them with other financial
institutions. See Henry A. Barkhausen, Derivatives in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from
Lehman Brothers, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Winter 2010, at 7, 7.
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and even the parties themselves in some cases.2 Third, regulators,
financial institutions, and market participants did not have
available sufficiently robust mechanisms to keep track of financial
contracts and the aggregate, system-wide risks they created.
As financial regulators continue to adopt rules under
the Dodd-Frank Act, they will have to answer a number of
foundational questions. What does it mean for a financial
institution to be interconnected to another, or two other, or n
other institutions? How can regulators distinguish between
socially beneficial and socially harmful interconnections? Is it
possible for regulators to identify growing, system-wide risks,
and to devise and implement solutions in a timely fashion? What
does it mean for two or more financial contracts to be
interconnected? What are the risks of having n interconnected
contracts involving k institutions (and other types of
counterparties)? What type of information about interconnected
financial institutions and interconnected financial contracts
must parties possess to make optimal contracting and risk
allocation decisions? What type of information must regulators
possess to engage in real-time oversight of the financial system?
Almost three years into the Act, regulators have
adopted only a relatively small number of the rules dealing
with these foundational questions. This delay in fleshing out
Dodd-Frank is due in part to political factors and regulatory
overload. But it is also due to a deeper and more basic
theoretical issue: we still lack an adequate account of an
increasingly common type of financial transaction, which I will
refer to as “n-contracts-transactions.” In these transactions,
multiple parties are bound together, often indirectly and
without privity of contract or knowledge of the identities of the
other parties in the n – 1 contracts that comprise the one,
global transaction. These transactions are not innocuous. They
can lead to the spillover of counterparty risks among parties
that are not in privity of contract. They are also not well
understood, notwithstanding their ubiquity.
More generally, transitive-risk contracts involve three
or more interconnected parties, such as when A enters into a
contract with B, and B enters into a contract with C. Although
A and C are not in contractual privity, the transactional risks
2

See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GRP. III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC
RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM 4 (2008), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/
docs/CRMPG-III.pdf (describing the complexity faced by financial institutions in the
day-to-day risk management of portfolios of complex securities).
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of the first contract may spill over to C, and those of the second
contract may spill over to A. I will refer to this sort of
externality as “transitive counterparty risk.” On the other
hand, if A, B, and C were parties to a single contract, A and C
could protect themselves by including the necessary provisions
in the contract. This article’s theory of transitive-risk contracts
will offer an account of the role of n-contracts-transactions in
transferring transitive counterparty risk.
Transitive-risk contracts are common in financial
settings. The relationship between bank depositors and bank
borrowers involves transitive-risk contracts. Bank depositors are
also in a transitive-risk relationship with each other, as are
lenders in repo transactions. Transitive-risk contracts are also
present in securitizations and more general transactions
involving derivatives. It turns out that the most basic
transaction involving financial institutions—that in which they
act as financial intermediaries—is the prototypical transitiverisk contract.
If we are to fully understand what caused the Great
Recession and how to avoid a recurrence, we must first answer
two basic questions. Why so many financial contracts? And why
so many transitive-risk contract relationships? One
explanation is that financial institutions, their customers, and
rating agencies, engage in self-serving opportunistic behavior.
They used financial contracts—in express or tacit collusion—to
transfer risks to unsuspecting, underinformed (or, in some
instances, misinformed) third parties. A second possible
explanation is far less nefarious. Pursuant to this explanation,
in the period leading to the Great Recession, financial
engineers took standard securities and divided them into a
series of new rights and obligations that allowed parties to
better allocate risks.3 This disaggregation–reaggregation
process eventually led to the creation and distribution of a
large number of new securities—some relatively simple, others
extremely complex.
In detailing the operation of transitive-risk contracts
and their role in transferring transitive counterparty risk, the
analysis developed in this article provides a positive account of
3

This fragmentation of standard transactions into a sequence of
subtransactions had an important aim: to approximate the type of state-contingent
securities introduced by the economists Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu. But once
disaggregated into myriad subtransactions, it became possible to recombine them in various
different ways, both to disperse risk and engage in speculation. See infra Part II.C.
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modern financial markets, financial contracting, and complex
financial institutions, including the interconnectedness between
financial institutions that led to the collapse of Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers. The next step—which is beyond the scope of
this article—will be to provide an account of how to design legal
rules (and contracts) to deal with transitive counterparty risks.
Part I provides an overview of financial contracts and
financial institutions. Part II develops a positive account of the
fragmentation of financial transactions, and, in doing so,
provides an account of contractual relationships among financial
institutions and between institutions and their customers. Part
III sets forth a new theory of the interconnection of financial
contracts and, by extension, the interconnection among financial
institutions that are either parties to those contracts or
indirectly affected by them. In the absence of any such theory,
regulators will find it virtually impossible to craft and
implement the kind of macroprudential regulations required by
the Dodd-Frank Act, and to test, in real time, whether those
regulations are working as expected and address any
shortcomings. Part IV applies the theory to a number of general
scenarios involving financial institutions and financial contracts.
I.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: BACKGROUND

Households and business firms own real assets, such as
personal and real property, and, in the case of firms, raw
materials and equipment, which they use to produce and
market goods and services; both also may own intangible
assets,4 including intellectual property and human capital,5 and
financial assets, such as equity6 or debt7 securities. A financial
4

Real assets also include intangible assets, such as intellectual property. See
THOMAS S.Y. HO & SANG BIN LEE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MODELING 17 (2004)
(drawing a distinction between two types of real assets, tangible and intangible assets).
5
See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 33-51 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing value
of education as investment in human capital).
6
An equity security such as common stock creates ownership rights,
including the right to vote on certain corporate matters and to receive dividends, when
declared by the board, and liquidation distributions. Preferred stock is a second type of
equity security, one that has certain preferences over common stock, such as a priority
over dividends and liquidation distributions. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151
(2013) (describing common and preferred stock).
7
For example, a debt contract creates a contractual claim on assets that
backs up the debtor’s promise to pay the interest and principal when due; it also
provides the creditor with contingent control rights, in case the debtor defaults See
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 80-87 (2006) (describing various
aspects of loan agreements and debt securities, including the pledging of collateral, the
use of positive and negative covenants, and consequences of default and bankruptcy).
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asset is a claim on the cash flows produced by real assets, and,
as such, it is a useful device for valuing those underlying
assets8 and controlling their use and disposition.9 Financial
institutions help households and firms (including other
financial institutions) manage investment risks associated with
holding financial assets and the liquidity risks associated with
varying cash flows and investment or consumption opportunities.
Financial institutions, however, own primarily financial assets,
and they finance their operations mostly by borrowing funds,
often on a short-term basis. These characteristics of their balance
sheet expose them to liquidity and insolvency risks that can
spill over to other financial institutions, as well as to
households and non-financial firms.10
This part begins by describing liquidity problems and how
financial institutions help alleviate them. It continues by
explaining how financial institutions act as investment
intermediaries, helping firms and households deal with the
informational asymmetry problems inherent in investment
decisions. The part concludes by analyzing liquidity problems
within financial institutions and by providing a normative
account of why the fragility of institutions matters.
A.

Liquidity Problems and Financial Intermediaries

The actors charged with running firms and households
operate within an intertemporal framework: in each period
they make decisions that can affect their current and future
welfare.11 More specifically, at time t, an actor will choose the
8

See HO & LEE, supra note 4, at 17 (defining financial assets as claims on
real assets, and describing their use in valuing those assets). Financial assets may also
involve claims over intangible assets such as human capital. An individual can, for
example, borrow against her expected future earnings. See Theo S. Eicher, Human
Capital and Technological Change, 63 REV. ECON. STUDIES 127, 129 (1996) (developing
theory in which individuals borrow to acquire human capital, in expectation of future
income); Oliver Hart & John Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of
Human Capital, 109 Q. J. ECON. 841, 841-42 (1994) (discussing borrowing constraints
based on ability of debtors to threaten to withdraw their human capital after they have
received money, a strategy that they would use in order to renegotiate the original debt
contract on more favorable terms).
9
See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 56-59
(1995) (describing role of real assets in establishing authority and power within
business firms).
10
See Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. ECON. L IT. 287,
297-98 (2011).
11
See George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Inter-temporal Choice, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181, 181 (defining intertemporal choices as “decisions in
which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out over time”). In choosing a course
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consumption or investment strategy that will maximize her
intertemporal utility. In doing so, she will take into account the
instantaneous utility from using part of her wealth to consume
goods in the current period. She will also take into account the
expected returns (properly discounted to account for her
impatience), if she decides to invest that portion of her wealth
and delay her consumption.12
As a general matter, firms and households prefer to
“smooth” their consumption over time.13 In order to smooth
consumption effectively and ensure that funds will be available
if an investment opportunity arises, both firms and households
must predict: (1) when they expect to need the funds; and (2)
the likelihood that they will have access to those funds, either
by using cash savings, transforming some of their assets into
cash, borrowing funds, or in the case of firms, selling equity or
debt securities.14 A firm or household has a “liquidity problem”15
if it needs funds—to consume, pay debts, or invest in a valuable
project—at a particular point in time and does not have access

of action, at time t, a rational actor will take into account the instantaneous utility, if
any, that it will receive immediately, ut, which will depend on the current state of the
world, st, and the payoffs, xt, given that state of the world. This may be expressed as ut
(xt|st). It will look into the future, and thus choose the course of action that will
maximize the sum of instantaneous utility in the current period and in each relevant
future period; it will discount the latter to account for: (1) the uncertainty regarding
future states of the world, using its subjective probability distribution over these future
states; and (2) the actor’s impatience, as captured by her discount factor, δ. If we let p(st+1)
capture the probability distribution over possible states in period t + 1, then, in period t,
the actor will determine the expected payoffs, discounting them, in turn, by δ, to account
for its impatience. Under the standard intertemporal model individuals are assumed to
use an intertemporal utility function that captures the sum of their utility over their
whole life. See Robert J. Barro and James W. Friedman, On Uncertain Lifetimes, J. POL.
ECON. 843, 844-46 (1977) (developing intertemporal utility model in which individuals
maximizes the sum of their utility over a lifetime and where positive discounting is due to
the potential that individual will die before being able to consume goods).
12
That is, the actor may invest funds, at time t, in order to produce greater
wealth at time t + 1. Alternatively, it may choose to consume in period t and borrow
funds at time t + 1 to finance further consumption or to make investments. The actor
will save at time t only if the rate of return on that investment is at least as high as its
personal impatience captured by δ.
13
See John H. Cochrane, A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance, 99 J. POL.
ECON. 557, 557-59 (1991) (summarizing arguments regarding preference for income
smoothing in households). See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 212-13 (discussing reaction of
firms to uncertainty regarding future liquidity, and incentive to hoard cash, to smooth
over low cash flow periods).
14
See Tirole, supra note 10, at 288 (describing liquidity as “stores of value”).
15
See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 199-201 (describing fact that firms will worry
about future ability to finance valuable projects, make further investments in existing
projects, or pay creditors on a timely fashion, stating that such “liquidity shortages
reflect an inadequacy between available resources and refinancing needs,” and
providing examples of typical types of liquidity problems).
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to them or the cost of acquiring them (by selling assets,
borrowing, or selling equity) is sufficiently high.16
Banks,17 investment banks,18 insurance companies,19
hedge funds,20 and private equity funds,21 are in the business of
creating and dealing with financial claims.22 As such, they play
an important role in helping firms and households smooth
consumption, and thus to deal with liquidity problems. Some
types of financial contracts allow investors to borrow funds
16

See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (setting forth such a model to
explain role of banks in helping reduce liquidity risks).
17
See XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF
BANKING 1 (1997) (defining a bank as a firm whose “operations consist in granting
loans and receiving deposits from the public”). The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
defines a “bank” as an “insured bank” under the FDIC Act or any institution organized
under Federal or state law which both accepts demand deposits and is in the business
of making commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2006). Under the FDIC Act, an
“insured bank” is a state or federally chartered bank whose deposits are insured by the
FDIC. Id. § 1813(a) and (h).
18
Investment banks act as underwriters, brokers and dealers, and advisors
in takeovers and other types of transactions. See Section 2(a)(11) of Securities Act of
1933 (defining “underwriter” as “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a
view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security”). Securities Act of 1933, ch, 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2006)). Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a
“broker” as any person “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others.” Section 3(a)(5)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
defines a “dealer” as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.” Securities
Act of 1934, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).
19
Section 201(a)(13) of the Dodd-Frank Act defines an “insurance company”
as “any entity that is—(A) engaged in the business of insurance; (B) subject to
regulation by a State insurance regulator; and (C) covered by a State law that is
designed to specifically deal with the rehabilitation, liquidation, or insolvency of an
insurance company.” Dodd Frank Act, Pub. L. No 111-203 (2010).
20
See Nicholas Chan et al., Do Hedge Funds Increase Systemic Risks?, ECON.
REV. FEDERAL RESERVE OF ATLANTA 49, 49 (Fourth Quarter 2006) (defining hedge
funds as “investment partnerships that engage in a variety of active trading strategies”
on behalf of investors).
21
See Dodd-Frank Act, § 619 (h)(2) (defining private equity and hedge funds
as “issuers that would be an investment company, as defined in the Investment
Company Act of 1940 . . . , but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar
funds as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule, as
provided in subsection (b)(2), determine”).
22
More generally, financial intermediaries transform one type of financial
claim into another by entering into financial contracts with investors and firms that
need capital. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 15 (defining financial
intermediaries as firms that “specialize[ ] in . . . buying and selling (at the same time)
financial contracts and securities” and who are in the business of transforming
financial inputs into outputs); see also Evan Gatev & Philip E. Straham, Banks’
Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper
Market, 61 J. FIN. 867, 870-71 (describing role played by commercial paper facilities in
providing liquidity, as an alternative to funding by financial intermediaries such as banks).
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from institutions;23 others, allow them to lend funds to
institutions on a short-term basis, which is important, given
that short-maturities help alleviate liquidity risks.24 More
generally, a financial institution enters into contracts with its
customers whereby the latter makes one or more payments in
return for the institution’s promise to distribute funds, deliver
commodities or securities, or perform some other activity at a
later time.25
For example, a demand deposit26 account allows
depositors to lend money to a bank in return for a promise that
they can withdraw their funds, without penalty, whenever they
need them, simply by making a “demand” on the bank.27 An
23

For example, business firms and households can set up lines of credit with
banks to deal with liquidity shocks that require quick access to funds. See Arie Melnik
& Steven Plaut, Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of Lending, and Credit Allocation,
41 J. FIN. 425, 426-27 (1986) (discussing role of line of credits in providing contingent
liquidity).
24
See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL
CRISES 58-59 (2007) (discussing problem of consumers’ uncertain future liquidity
preferences and role of banks in reducing risk).
25
See Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial
Intermediation, 24 FIN. MANAGEMENT 23, 24 (1995) (describing role of financial
intermediaries in “issuing contingent-payment contracts to their customers”); FREIXAS
& ROCHET, supra note 17, at 2-4 (describing various liquidity and payment services
provided by banks.
26
When a customer opens a demand deposit account at a bank, it acquires a
financial contract that allows it to make withdrawals at any time and potentially
receive interest payments in the meantime. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2 (b)(1) (2009) (defining
a “demand deposit” as a deposit with a bank that is payable on demand).
27
Assume that in Period 0, a group of individuals deposit funds in a bank. In
Period 1, the short-term depositors will need liquid assets and will withdraw their
funds; the long-term depositors, on the other hand, will leave their money in the bank
until Period 2. The problem is that in Period 0, none of the individuals know whether
they will be short-term or long-term depositors. In other words, each individual is
making an intertemporal decision in which its future utility, u1, in Period 1, depends
on which state of the world, s1, emerges and the payoffs, x1, under the possible states.
There are two possible states of the world: the individual will have no need for the
liquid assets, or the individual will need them to consume or make an investment. If
the individual can correctly predict that she will not need liquid assets during Period 1,
then she would maximize her return by making a long-term investment, lasting two
periods, and producing a Period 2 payoff that is larger than if she had preserved the
option to withdraw funds during Period 1. On the other hand, if she misjudges and
commits to a long-term investment but turns out to need the funds in Period 1, then
she will experience a liquidity problem. Banks can help reduce this liquidity risk by
providing depositors with a “real option”: a depositor with a demand deposit account
can wait until she learns whether she is a short-term or long-term depositor during
Period 1. In Period 0, the bank will lend a portion of those deposits to borrowers, who
agree to repay in Period 2, at an interest rate that is high enough to reflect the fact
that they will keep the funds for two periods. Borrowers that want uninterrupted
access to funds are willing to pay a premium for a long-term two-period loan as opposed
to two short-term one-period loans (given that there is some probability the bank will
refuse to roll over the loan in Period 1). In determining how much it can lend, a bank
will predict how many depositors will withdraw their funds in Period 1 and it will keep
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insurance company sells policies to customers who pay
premiums in return for the company’s obligation to pay out a
certain amount upon the occurrence of a specified event, such
as a fire or death.28 Insurance, therefore, allows households and
businesses to deal with unforeseen contingencies that can
affect their cash flows. Moreover, non-insurance companies can
sell products that are functionally equivalent to insurance,
such as credit default swaps, in which the owner of a debt
security makes “premium” payments to a third party in return
for a promise to make a “payout” to it if the issuer of the
security defaults. Mortgage-backed securities and other more
traditional types of pooling and selling future cash flows—such
as the sale of account receivables to a factor—allow lenders to
manage their liquidity needs.29 Mortgage-backed securities in
turn help reduce the cost of borrowing for homeowners,
allowing easier access to second mortgages and lines of credit.30
B.

Financial Institutions as Investment Intermediaries

A shareholder’s returns will depend on the actions of the
company’s managers, creditors, and other shareholders; it will
also depend on her own vigilance and diversification decisions.
The same is true of debtholders, although their risk of loss is not
as great, given that they have a contractual right that is prior to
that of shareholders. Both types of investors can search for their
own investment opportunities—the screening process—and
the appropriate reserves. Because banks have a large number of depositors, they can
achieve some degree of diversification regarding the different maturity dates of
depositors and better match the longer-term maturity dates of borrowers. See Gary
Gorton, Bank Regulation When ‘Banks’ and ‘Banking’ Are Not the Same, 10 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 106, 117 (1994) (describing role of bank in reducing depositors’
liquidity risks while providing almost risk-free security); ALLEN & GALE, supra note 24,
at 52-54 (explaining why borrowers are willing to pay a bank a higher rate in order to
achieve longer maturities than they would get if they directly transacted with
depositors, who, as a general matter, want to keep their assets relatively liquid).
28
See Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 172 (1868) (stating that an
insurance contract involves “exchanging sums of money for promises of indemnity
against losses”).
29
Loans are assets on a bank’s balance sheet and are relatively illiquid. Loan
participations and securitization transactions are two devices used by banks to sell
parts or all of a loan before maturity. See Richard Y. Roberts & Randall W. Quinn,
Leveling the Playing Field: The Need for Investor Protection for Bank Sales of Loan
Participations, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115, 2117-20 (1995) (providing an overview of
loan participation transactions); Tamar Frankel, Securitization: The Conflict Between
Personal and Market Law (Contract and Property), 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 20209 (1999) (giving an overview of the securitization process).
30
BOND MKT. ASS’N, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASS-THROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED
MORTGAGE SECURITIES 2, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/about_MBS.pdf.
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monitor managers after the fact. On the other hand, they may
delegate some or all of these screening and monitoring tasks to
financial institutions, thereby avoiding wasteful duplication of
effort31 and making use of economies of scale.32 More generally,
financial intermediaries use their expertise to reduce two
informational risks faced by investors: the adverse selection33
and agency34 problems.35 For example, investors entrust their
money to mutual funds,36 hedge funds, private equity firms, and
venture capital partnerships, who promise to invest it on their
behalf in return for a management fee.37

31

See Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., Monitoring by and of Banks: A Discussion,
in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY: READINGS AND PERSPECTIVES
IN MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 122 (Sudipto Bhattacharya et al. eds., 2004) (stating
that informational intermediaries are able to avoid duplicative screening).
32
See Ram T.S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, Information Reliability
and a Theory of Financial Intermediation, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 415-32 (1984) (making
an economies of scale argument in the context of delegated monitoring to
intermediaries).
33
Adverse selection problems arise whenever a firm seeks funds from outside
investors. Because managers know more about the firm’s current financial state,
potential investors will discount for the risk that they may be buying into a “lemon.”
Unless “good firms” can credibly signal that they are not lemons, they will face higher
funding costs and, in some cases, may not be able to raise funds. In order for the signal
to be credible and effective it has to be one that cannot be mimicked by an
entrepreneur with a bad project. See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons:
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (setting
forth standard treatment of adverse selection problem in context of used car dealers,
which have informational advantage over potential purchases of “lemons”); Stewart C.
Myers & Nicholas Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1984);
TIROLE, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing adverse selection problem when companies try
to raise additional funds by selling equity or debt securities to capital markets).
34
After an investment is made, managers may fail to act in the best interest
of investors. This type of agency problem is sometimes referred to as a “moral hazard”
problem. See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 113.
35
Financial institutions have special expertise in dealing with adverse
selection and agency problems, by screening and monitoring investments on behalf of
their customers. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 29-32 (discussing role played
by banks in reducing adverse selection and agency problems).
36
A mutual fund is subject to the Investment Company Act because it falls
under the definition of an “investment company.” An investment company is an issuer
that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily,
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” See the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2006).
37
These institutions are obligated to safeguard these funds and return them
to the clients, either on demand or on a delayed basis. For example, hedge funds will
generally restrict the ability of clients to withdraw funds without providing a sufficient
amount of notice. This will allow the funds to invest in more illiquid assets. See Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 47 (1997)
(discussing problem faced by hedge funds if investors withdraw funds en masse and
describing contractual provisions in some fund contracts that restrict the ability to
withdraw capital at will).
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Leverage and Insolvency Risks for Financial Institutions

Financial institutions fund their businesses primarily
by borrowing funds,38 and thus, compared to non-financial
firms, they are more highly leveraged39 and more susceptible to
insolvency and failure.40 Their obligations, moreover, include
standard long-term and short-term debt, as well as
nonstandard liabilities, such as the contractual obligations to
customers discussed above. As a general matter, a financial
institution will have an incentive to increase its leverage
whenever it believes that an investment will yield a higher
return than the interest it will pay to finance it.41 Moreover, if it
has easy access to credit, it will be able to enter into a greater
number of investments than if it had to sell equity or rely
solely on internally produced cash flows.42 While easy access to

38

See James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 403, 409 (2009), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/09/09/part1/Bullard.pdf.
39
See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 98-99 (stating that banks have large debt-toequity ratios). A firm’s leverage or debt-to-equity ratio captures the extent to which
equity holders are relying on other people’s money to finance operations. A number of
related leverage ratios are useful in assessing the risk that a firm has borrowed too
much money. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND
TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 51 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing
debt-to-equity, long-term debt-to-total-capital, and market-value-debt-to-equity ratios).
40
See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 24, at 126-27 (discussing fragility of
financial institutions and the effect of their failure on financial markets, as well as the
role of market volatility in threatening viability of institutions).
41
Borrowing money is like renting an apartment. In both cases, one takes
possession of someone else’s property for a period of time, paying for the privilege of
using that property and agreeing to return it at the end of the term. The goal is to create
a return from renting and using the property that exceeds the “rental” payments.
42
Some theorists have argued that increasing a firm’s leverage is an
important tool in reducing the agency costs created by managers, since unlike equity,
debt obligates managers to distribute a portion of its cash flows back to the capital
markets. This pay-out obligation restricts the ability of managers to use the cash for
wasteful investment projects. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (developing free cash
flow theory in which agency costs are reduced by tying managers hands with debt
payout obligations). This theory fails, however, to take into account the fact that the
decision to borrow money is made endogenously by the same managers, who
presumably would tie their hands only if they anticipated a need to pay out free cash
flows in the future. Without such a need, managers would see no reason to so bind
themselves unless they anticipated self-control problems that could lead them to
engage in suboptimal investments in the future. Nevertheless, the free cash flow
theory adopts the standard economic assumption that actors are fully rational and thus
have perfect self-control. See generally Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the Law,
in THE THIEF OF TIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253 (Chrisoula
Andreou & Mark D. White eds., 2010) (developing a procrastination model in which
actors with preferences for immediate gratification would repeatedly delay carrying out
actions they believed to be optimal in the long-term).

1452

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

credit helps magnify potential profits, it also magnifies
potential losses.43
Highly leveraged firms can become insolvent44 if the
value of their marketable assets or their cash flows are
subjected to unexpected outside shocks.45 In the case of
financial institutions these assets are primarily intangible in
nature, such as loans and securities,46 including complex
derivatives, that are difficult to value and sell quickly, when an
institution is facing a liquidity crisis;47 and their cash flows are
generated primarily from proprietary investments and
transactions with customers, who may withdraw their business
upon the first sign of trouble. Insolvency can trigger defaults in
credit agreements, leading to bankruptcy proceedings48 in a
bankruptcy court or, in the case of insured financial institutions,
through the resolution authority granted to the FDIC.49
D.

Liquidity Problems Faced by Financial Institutions

Modern financial institutions are in the business of
borrowing on a short-term basis and using those funds to make

43

See Chan et al., supra note 20, at 50 (stating that leverage helps to expand
small profit opportunities into large ones while also increasing the potential for
transforming small losses into larger ones).
44
As a general matter, a firm is insolvent if it has more liabilities than
assets. See Edward I. Altman, Financial Rations, Discriminant Analysis and the
Predictions of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589, 595 (1968) (defining insolvency as
state in which the “total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of the firm’s assets with
value determined by the earning power of the assets.”).
45
See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 472 (2005) (stating that if leverage
ratio is too high it may be a sign that firm has taken on too much debt and may be unable
to generate enough earnings to pay the principal and interest as it becomes due).
46
Financial assets, such as securities, are more complex than tangible assets
such as equipment and inventory, in part because they are more volatile and deal with
a large number of potential future states of the world. See Karen Eggleston et al., The
Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91,
97-100 (2000) (arguing that contractual complexity increases with “(1) the expected
number of payoff-relevant contingencies specified in the contract; [and] (2) the variance
in the magnitude of the payoffs contracted to flow between the parties,” since these
create more states of the world for a decisionmaker to take into account).
47
See Viral Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and
Remedies, 18 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 89, 92 (2009).
48
See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing the expected costs of
bankruptcy associated with borrowing more money).
49
See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006) (discussing triggering events for FDIC
intervention and prompt corrective actions). After the Dodd-Frank Act, systemically
important institutions will also be treated in this manner. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 201-17 (2010).
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long-term loans or purchase relatively illiquid assets.50
Financial institutions borrow on a short-term basis, with the
expectation that they will be able to continually renew their
short-term loans (that is, to roll over those loans) each time
they mature. If a financial institution successfully matches its
short-term borrowings with its long-term loans51 and illiquid
investments, it will make a profit equal to the difference
between the amount it pays to borrow on a short-term basis and
the higher return from these riskier, longer-term transactions.
If, on the other hand, a financial institution cannot continue
borrowing on a short-term basis or secure longer-term financing
quickly, it will face a liquidity problem.52 The institution will
thus have to pay more to borrow, post more collateral,53 or,
alternatively, sell some of its long-term assets, usually at a
discount. This sort of liquidity risk is referred to as the
“maturity mismatch problem,” because it stems from the
difference in maturity between an institution’s sources of funds
and the loans or investments made with those funds.54
E.

Why the Failure of Financial Institutions Matters

The period leading to the Great Recession was one of
great creativity in liquidity and portfolio management: some
innovations helped increase overall social welfare; others,
however, ended up creating unforeseen insolvency and liquidity
risks for financial intermediaries. Parties to a contract always
bear a risk that the other party will default on its obligations—
the “counterparty risk.” Given the relative fragility of financial
institutions, due to the insolvency and liquidity risks discussed
in the previous two sections, one would expect that financial
contracts involve higher levels of counterparty risk than
contracts between business firms and their customers or
suppliers.55 Moreover, the failure of a financial institution can
50

See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 435 (G.M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003)
(describing the differences between securities issued to borrowers and lenders).
51
Long-term loans command a higher return because they are riskier: they require
purchasers to lock in their funds until the assets are sold or mature. See supra note 26.
52
See generally Tirole, supra note 10 (providing an overview of different
aspects of liquidity in financial institutions and the role played by sudden illiquidity in
precipitating Great Recession).
53
See id. at 288-90 (discussing the role played by funding and market illiquidity).
54
See Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, Does Bank Capital
Affect Lending Behavior?, 13 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 436, 437 (2004).
55
See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Efficient Governance Structure:
Implication for Banking Regulation, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
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impose negative externalities on a larger portion of society.
When a business firm fails, the consequences are felt primarily
by its shareholders, creditors, and employees, not by its
customers.56 By contrast, a financial institution’s customers
enter into contractual relationships that place them in a
particularly vulnerable position if the institution fails.57 The
managers of financial institutions, in short, can impose agency
costs both on investors58 and customers.59 This risk of loss for
customers is one of the reasons why financial institutions face
more strenuous regulatory oversight than do business firms.60
12, 18-26 (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993) (developing informational asymmetry and
agency model and extending it to financial firms, such as banks).
56
There are of course exceptions. A customer that is relying on a producer to
supply unique or custom-made products will suffer some transitional costs until it can
find an alternate supplier. A customer of this type enters into the contract in order to
assure that it will have the requisite supply of goods at the time that it needs them.
One would expect that customers who are entering into long-term contracts for the
provision of specialized goods to discount for the risks of unforeseen contingencies as
well as for the potential opportunistic seller. See Merton, supra note 25, at 35
(discussing the difference between business firms that sell products with warranty and
financial firms).
57
The customers of a financial institution will include both the providers of
funds, such as bank depositors, and borrowers. While depositors are in a more
vulnerable position than borrowers, a bank’s failure can create harm for both types of
customers, particularly short-term borrowers who were expecting that the bank would
continue to roll-over the loans. See Graciela L. Kaminsky et al., The Unholy Trinity of
Financial Contagion, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 54 (2003). For example, a bank that is a
repeat player with a borrower will have private information about the borrower’s
business that will allow it to better price the loan transaction and adopt the requisite
loan covenants. If a bank fails, the borrower will have to find a new lender who will not
have access to this private information and will protect itself by charging a higher
interest rate. As a result, one cost of a bank’s failure is that valuable information about
borrowers is lost. See Xavier Freixas & Anthony M. Santomero, An Overall Perspective
on Banking Regulation, in FINANCIAL REGULATION 429 (A. Boot et al. eds., 2002)
(describing social cost of lost information about borrowers); Myron B. Slovin, Marie E.
Sushka & John A. Polonchek, The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank
Stakeholders, 48 J. FIN. 247, 256-57 (1993) (empirical study finding that the failure of
Continental Illinois had a negative effect on market value of firms with a known
borrowing relationship with the bank); Nobuyoshi Yamori & Akinobu Murakami, Does
Bank Relationship Have an Economic Value?: The Effect of Main Bank Failure on Client
Firms, 65 ECON. LETTERS 115, 117-18 (1999) (empirical study after failure of large Japanese
bank, finding that customers with closest borrowing relationship with bank suffered large
negative reaction in stock price after announcement of bank’s problems).
58
Moreover, since managers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, they will
sometimes have incentives to manage a firm to maximize returns to shareholders, at
the expense of other constituencies, including a firm’s customers.
59
See Merton, supra note 25, at 34 (arguing that customers of financial firms
enter into transactions expecting that firms will be able to perform their obligations at
the allotted time, while investors value firms based on expected returns but also taking
into account risk of insolvency).
60
See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 263-65. An additional reason for
the prevalence of regulations to protect the customers of financial institutions is that
as they get closer to insolvency, their shareholders will have an incentive to undertake
very risky transactions to “gamble for resurrection.” See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra
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Many of these regulations, however, were designed to reduce the
risk that a financial institution’s failure would harm the real
sector of the economy, households, and nonfinancial firms.61
The spillover effect of an institution’s failure extends
beyond the losses borne by customers. The failure of a
sufficiently large, highly interconnected financial institution
can lead to the failure of other institutions. In fact, even
relatively small shocks to one part of the financial system can
quickly spread to others,62 precipitating a crisis63 that could
threaten the entire system64 if market participants and
regulators fail to take corrective steps quickly enough.65

note 55, at 26-28 (discussing perverse incentive of shareholders to increase risks at
expense of customers of financial intermediaries and increased incentive of managers
to hide problems).
61
See Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 14, 14 (1989) (discussing interaction between systemic
problems in the financial sector and the real sector and a potential for contagion from
one to the other).
62
The likelihood that a financial shock will spill over to other parts of the
system is called “systemic risk.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
204, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk as the “risk that (i) an economic shock such as
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the
failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility”); Hedge
Funds, Systematic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, Hearing Before the
Comm. On Oversight of Gov. Reform (written testimony of Prof. Andrew Lo, MIT School
of Management) [hereinafter Lo] (defining systemic risk as the risk of a “broad-based
breakdown in the financial system, often realized as a series of correlated defaults
among financial institutions, typically banks, that occurs over a short-period of time
and typically caused by a single major event”).
63
A “financial crisis” arises whenever a relatively small change in the
financial system triggers a wide swing in the overall or aggregate state of the system.
See MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION:
BUBBLES, CRASHES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND HERDING 220 (2001) (as a general
matter, a “financial crisis” is a system-wide crisis affecting one or more parts of a
financial system).
64
See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A
Critical Assessment of the “New Financial Architecture”, 33 CAMB. J. ECON. 563, 572-73
(2009) (describing system-wide risk in the context of financial crises).
65
In fact, while the subprime crisis created great harm for many households,
it played only a relatively small role in the Great Recession. See Markus K.
Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 77, 77 (2009) (describing the losses due to subprime loans as “relatively modest”
compared to the losses when the stock market subsequently crashed); Gary Gorton,
The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 30-31 (2009) (arguing that losses in the
subprime market were not enough to trigger the crisis until it became “common
knowledge” due to introduction of the ABX index, which allowed traders to hedge and
speculate vis-à-vis deteriorating portfolios of asset-backed securities).
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DERIVED FROM ARROW: THE FRAGMENTATION OF
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

In a world of complete capital markets, parties would be
able to hedge against all possible risks. But capital markets
work best when the traded securities are not too complex, so
that market participants can understand them and value them
66
accurately, in a timely fashion. This part examines the extent
to which it is possible to design and implement complete
markets and the costs of attempting to do so but falling short.
It begins by examining the role of securities markets and the
problems of excessive speculation and self-dealing in market
transactions. It then describes the general theory of complete
markets and state-contingent securities. It concludes by
arguing that the quest for complete markets has led to a
fragmentation of transactions and the emergence of ncontracts-transactions.
A.

Securities Markets and the Great Recession

Parties will create and administer securities markets
only to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs.67 So how do
securities markets create value? First, they provide a venue for
hedging—that is, distributing risk from risk-averse actors to
66

See Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial
Intermediation, 24 FIN. MGMT. 23, 26 (1995) (arguing that financial markets are
efficient alternatives to financial intermediaries but only to the extent that securities
are standardized, widely distributed, and “well-enough ‘understood’ for transactors to
be comfortable in assessing their prices”).
67
See Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75, 76 (1976)
(discussing cost-benefit analysis involved in setting up contingent-state markets).
Financial institutions play an important role in reducing the transaction costs of using
financial markets, including establishing and administering payment and clearing
facilities for financial transactions. See MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
THEORY 14-16 (1995) (describing ways in which financial institutions help create
markets, including helping facilitate transactions and assuring that there is sufficient
liquidity for those wishing to trade); Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi, Contagion and
Efficiency in Gross and Net Interbank Payment Systems, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION,
AND THE MACROECONOMY, supra note 31, at 297, 299-302 (describing interbank
payment systems and the role of financial institutions in assuring that they operate
without interruptions); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act § 803(7)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5462(7) (2010) (defining “payment, clearing,
or settlement activity” as “an activity carried out by 1 or more financial institutions to
facilitate the completion of financial transactions”, including “(i) funds transfers; (ii)
securities contracts; (iii) contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery; (iv)
forward contracts; (v) repurchase agreements; (vi) swaps; (vii) security-based swaps;
(viii) swap agreements; (ix) security-based swap agreements; (x) foreign exchange
contracts; (xi) financial derivatives contracts; and (xii) any similar transaction that the
Council determines to be a financial transaction for purposes of this title.”).
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those who are either less risk averse or have the expertise or
tools to deal with the risk more effectively. In other words, a
hedge transaction occurs when party A sells its risk to party B
for a premium, in a transaction where both parties benefit.68
Second, securities markets allow parties to speculate. The
speculator purchases a security not for its dividends or interest
payments, but for the potential capital gain.69 Third, securities
markets help aggregate and transfer70 information regarding
the securities traded. In a perfectly efficient market, the
market price will reflect the aggregate beliefs and expectations
of market participants.71
The Great Recession was caused in part by parties who
engaged in excessive “hedging” using securities that provided
them with a false sense of security and by excessive speculation
in markets with critical inefficiencies.72 This, in turn, led to the
demand for a greater number of financial contracts for hedging
and speculating, and the introduction of a plethora of new
securities. Self-dealing, gross negligence, and fraud also played
a role in the proliferation of transactions, such as those involving

68

In an insurance contract, a risk-averse individual sells a risk—for example,
the risk of a fire, automobile accident, or illness—to an insurance company, which has
the expertise, technology (in the form of actuarial tables), and ability to diversify that
risk. In return for buying that risk, the insurance company receives a premium. See
generally Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, Rational Insurance Purchasing:
Consideration of Contract Nonperformance, 105 Q.J. ECON. 243 (1990).
69
See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 290, 314-15 (describing speculation as
wasteful since the speculator acquires information solely for the purpose of
redistribution, instead of increasing aggregate welfare).
70
When parties trade securities they reveal information to each other and
third parties. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 278-92 (1992) (discussing role of unintentional
information leakage due to market transactions); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 573-74 (1984)
(discussing trade decoding and information leakage from informed traders to
uninformed ones).
71
See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 86 (1948) (arguing that the price system
allows individuals to make the right decisions by merely acting on the price, through
which “only the most essential information is passed on and passed on only to those
concerned”).
72
See Gorton, supra note 65, at 30-37 (describing collapse of subprime and
repo markets); Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in
August 2007? Evidence from Factors and Transaction Data, 14 J. FIN. MARKETS 1, 2-3
(2011) (describing the large losses experienced by hedge funds using quantitative
trading strategies (quant funds) in August 2007); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION 38-39 (2009) [hereinafter DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf
(describing run on money market).
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securities that were significantly overvalued, worthless,73 or
difficult to understand,74 and, ultimately, to the accumulation of
toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions.75
B.

The Quest for Complete Markets

Of the factors that led to the proliferation of
transactions in the period leading to the Great Recession—
excessive hedging—may at first glance appear to be the most
benign. However, one can make a strong case that the
incessant quest for the hedge, for insurance and the
reallocation of risk, was what led to the proliferation of new,
highly complex derivative securities, and eventually to selfdealing, fraud, and excessive speculation. To see why this is the
case, we must examine how derivative securities help make
markets more complete.
Financial derivatives act as “state-contingent securities”:
they help actors make investment decisions that take into
account both uncertainty76 and time. Kenneth Arrow and Gerard
Debreu developed a model of pure state-contingent securities77 in
which actors are able to effectively hedge for all possible risks,78
73

See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay
Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July
15, 201), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
74
See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 72,
at 2 (discussing the lack of transparency of complex financial derivatives).
75
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/TARP10-2012_0.pdf (providing an overview of the toxic assets held by
financial institutions who participated in the TARP program).
76
The most common way to model uncertainty is to posit that at any one
point in time, the environment is in a particular state, reflecting a set of properties
true to the environment at that time. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 33-34 (1974) (stating that a decision-maker will “consider the world to
be in one or another of a range of states,” where a state of the world is “a description
which is complete for all relevant purposes”).
77
See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of
Risk-Bearing, 31 REV. ECON. STUD. 91, 92-94 (1964) (originally published in French, in
1953). The economist Gerard Debreu also played a critical part in developing the statecontingent claim theory, and extending it. See GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN
AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM 98-102 (1959).
78
To see this, suppose that Anne is trying to make an intertemporal decision,
in which she has to choose to invest $100 that will produce an uncertain set of payoffs
in future periods. And suppose further that, for each future period, the possible states
of the world can be partitioned into mutually exclusive states and that, for each of
these possible states, Anne knows the expected payoffs that will result. A pure statecontingent security, introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, pays one unit
(for example, $1) if an event occurs and zero if it does not. If, at the time of making her
decision, Anne knew the value of each of these state-contingent securities, then she
would calculate the value of making that $100 by taking the sum of the expected
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but with a catch: in order to work one must create and
implement a state-contingent security for each possible state
of the world.79 Only then, when markets are “complete,” is it
possible to fully allocate risk in a Pareto optimal manner.80
With this in mind,81 financial theorists82 and practitioners83 set
out to design and market state-contingent securities. In
accepting the Nobel Prize for economics, Robert Merton
provided the best possible summary of the marriage of Arrow
and financial innovation:
During the last 25 years, finance theory has been a good predictor of
future changes in finance practice. That is, when theory seems to
suggest that something “should be there” and it isn’t, practice has
evolved so that it is. The “pure” securities developed by Kenneth J.
Arrow . . . that so clearly explain the theoretical function of financial
instruments in risk bearing were nowhere to be found in the real
world until the broad development of the options and derivativesecurity markets. It is now routine for financial engineers to
disaggregate the cash flows of various securities into their elemental
Arrow-security component parts and then to reaggregate them to
create securities with new patterns of cash flows.84

The proliferation of derivative securities can thus be
explained, at least in part, as an attempt to create securities
that come closer to the state-contingent securities posited by

returns for each state of the world. The expected return will be $0 if the state does not
occur, and the expected return will equal expected value ($1 × Expected Value) if the
state does occur. Thus, state-contingent securities allow Anne to value investments
based on each possible states of the occurring in each future period.
79
See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 709 (1995)
(describing an incomplete market as one in which there are fewer tradable assets than
there are states of the world); see also Ross, supra note 67, at 75 (stating that Arrow’s
theory of state-contingent securities “brought the recognition that an inadequate
number of markets in contingent claims would be a source of inefficiency”).
80
See MAS-COLLEL ET AL., supra note 79, at 692 (stating that if the ArrowDebreu conditions of the existence and tradability of state-contingent securities hold,
then, at equilibrium, one would have “an efficient allocation of risk”).
81
See Douglas T. Breeden & Robert H. Litzenberger, Prices of StateContingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices, 51 J. BUS. 621, 621 (1978) (stating that
the Arrow-Debreu, state-contingent model is “one of the most general frameworks
available for the theory of finance under uncertainty”).
82
See Ross, supra note 67, at 75 (stating that Arrow’s theory of statecontingent securities “brought the recognition that an inadequate number of markets
in contingent claims would be a source of inefficiency.”).
83
See Merton, supra note 66, at 28-32 (describing role of financial
institutions in financial innovation, including customizing and designing securities to
help customers engage in hedging activities).
84
Robert C. Merton, Applications of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty-Five
Years Later, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 341 n.31 (1998). Compare with Ross, supra note 67,
at 76 (writing in 1976, trying to address why there was such a paucity of Arrow securities).
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Arrow and Debreu.85 Standard equity and debt securities were
too coarse; their value depended on too many contingencies,
and, thus too many “intermingled” possible states of the world.
The financial engineering project described and
endorsed by Merton86 involved partitioning securities into
different components, each coming closer to the ideal ArrowDebreu security: one whose value depended on whether a
particular state of the world came to pass on a particular date.87
Stand-alone transactions involving coarse securities were each
divided into multiple transactions. This led to a proliferation of
transactions involving a larger number of parties. Some of these
transactions were subsequently combined into composite
derivative securities. This disaggregation–reaggregation process
increased the level of complexity,88 and over time made it
increasingly difficult to describe, understand, and properly
value the securities.89 The greater the complexity, the greater
the transaction costs90 of implementing and monitoring statecontingent securities.91
85

See Ross supra note 67, at 76 (discussing possibility of using derivative
products to make contingent-state markets more complete).
86
See Robert C. Merton, Financial Intermediation in the Continuous Time
Model, in CONTINUOUS TIME FINANCE 370 (1992) (providing a sustained defense of
financial engineering, notwithstanding the fact that the “products” that they produce
mimic “high-speed passenger trains”: socially beneficial but open to a few derailings
before all of the kinks are worked out).
87
See id. (stating that the “overriding theme of the theory has financial
innovation as the engine driving the financial system on its prospective journey to
efficiency and complete markets”).
88
A complex system is “one made up of a large number of parts that have
many interactions,” where complexity will increase whenever, given “the properties of
the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the
properties of the whole.” See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 18384, 207 (3d ed. 1996).
89
See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 72,
at 2 (discussing the use of complex financial products in the period leading up to the
Great Recession). Asset-backed securities pose particular challenges because the same
piece of collateral is often used to secure the obligations of multiple parties (tranching)
or as security in multiple transactions (pyramiding). See John Geanakoplos, Liquidity,
Default, and Crashes: Endogenous Contracts in General Equilibrium, in II ADVANCES
IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS APPLICATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATION: EIGHTH
WORLD CONGRESS 170, 173-74 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003) (defining
tranching and pyramiding).
90
A “transaction cost” is the cost of carrying out a transaction, including the
costs of identifying valuable transactions and suitable parties, foreseeing contingencies
and potential conflicts, bargaining, and drafting contracts. See HART, supra note 9, at
23 (emphasizing transaction costs due to foreseeing future contingencies, bargaining,
and drafting contracts that a third-party enforcer, such as a court, will be able to
interpret and determine whether it has been breached); Luca Anderlini & Leonardo
Felli, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature, Q.J. ECON. 1085
(1994) (describing the computational intractability problems when trying to write
complete contracts); Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion and
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n-Contracts Financial Transactions

We must now get a better sense of the fragmentation of
financial transactions. Fragmentation occurs when a single
transaction is partitioned into n number of subtransactions,
where each subtransaction has its own contract—an ncontracts-transaction. To do this we first need to settle on a
definition of transactions. As a general matter, a transaction
involves the transfer of a good, service, or security.92 This
definition is useful when considering the general problem of
transaction-cost economics. However, we are concerned with the
following questions. How does one determine the optimal
number of parties that should be involved in a transaction? For
example, given a transaction, M, for the sale of a good, service,
or security, should that transaction involve only the buyer and
seller, or should other parties be involved? Should it be carried
out through one global transaction, M, or should it be
partitioned into n number of subtransactions?
In order to answer these questions, we must use a more
precise definition of party, transaction, and subtransaction.
Two parties participate in a transaction if they have rights
and/or obligations in relation to each other that are either
enforceable in a court—as when the parties are in privity of
contract—or indirectly enforceable through reputational
constraints. A transaction may involve n number of
subtransactions (where n may equal 1). As a general matter,
then, a transaction can be defined as a “relationship” between
two or more parties to accomplish a goal related to the
purchase or sale of a good, service, or security.
While these definitions are intentionally fuzzy, they will
serve for the purposes of this article. Our principal goal is to
examine the fragmentation of securities transactions that arises
from the disaggregation and reaggregation of relationships, as
the Costs of Writing Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798 (2002) (setting forth detailed
theory of the effect of writing costs on contract incompleteness).
91
In fact transaction costs are a major obstacle to achieving complete
markets. See Merton, supra note 86, at 431-32 (discussing role of transaction costs in
connection with state-contingent securities and discussing role of financial
intermediaries in reducing transaction cost of producing and trading state-contingent
securities); Kenneth J. Arrow & Frank Hahn, Notes on Sequence Economies,
Transaction Costs, and Uncertainty, 86 J. ECON. THEORY 203, 213 (1999) (discussing
general problem of “missing securities” and role played by transaction costs).
92
See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, &
EFFICIENCY 21 (1992) (describing a “transaction” as “the most fundamental unit of
analysis in economic organization theory” and defining it as “the transfer of goods or
services from one individual to another”).
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described by Merton in the excerpt quoted above.93 At the same
time, this article aims to develop an account of the social costs
created
by
this
disaggregation–reaggragation
process.
Ultimately, a more precise definition must account for the
boundary between transactions and subtransactions.
This article argues that the question of whether a
transaction should be internalized into a single contract or
partitioned into n number of subtransactions (each with its
own contract) is analogous to the question raised by Ronald
Coase in The Nature of the Firm: when should a transaction be
internalized within a firm and when should it be carried out
externally
through
transactions
with
other
market
participants?94 A party who wants to achieve a particular goal
via a transaction will either carry it out within one global
transaction, M, or subdivide it into two or more subtransactions.
It will internalize the transaction within M only when the
transaction costs of doing so are lower than achieving that
same transactional goal via two or more subtransactions.95
For example, a transaction where A would lend money
to C could be partitioned into two subtransactions: one where A
lends money to B, a bank, and B lends money to C. These
initial transactions can be further partitioned. For example, G
could insure A’s deposits just as the FDIC does for bank
deposits. And C, who has borrowed money from the bank, could
use the loan to invest in E. A similar process occurs when an
equity fund, hedge fund, or venture capital firm borrows funds
and uses them to make further investments.
Similarly, a transaction where C borrows money from B
could be partitioned by having C borrow through n-debt
transactions with investors, who purchase debt securities. C
may hire a financial intermediary to act as an underwriter for
the issuance of those securities. The underwriter would then
act as agent for the ultimate purchasers. In turn, the company
93

See supra note 85.
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAW (1988).
95
See id. at 43 (arguing that transactions will be carried out within the firm
when the transaction costs of doing so are lower than carrying them out through
market transactions); see also Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford & Armen Alchian,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21
J. L & ECON. 297 (1978) (examining boundary between firm and markets, in contexts
where one party’s investment in the transaction can lead to opportunistic behavior by
other party); HART, supra note 9, at 29-55 (formal analysis of decision of whether to
internalize productions, and general difficulties of delineating where a firm ends and
market begins).
94
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and the purchasers would enter into a transaction with an
indenture trustee.
III.

A THEORY OF “TRANSITIVE-RISK” CONTRACTS

This part develops a new theory of interconnected
financial institutions and interconnected contracts. It begins by
analyzing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that are relevant
to the interconnectedness of financial institutions. It then sets
forth the theory of transitive-risk contracts. The theory offers a
bottom-up approach to understanding interconnectedness.
A.

The Dodd-Frank Act and the Interconnectedness of
Financial Institutions
96

One stated goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is to strengthen
97
the supervision of all large, complex financial organizations,
including subjecting them to “more stringent capital and
98
liquidity standards” and requiring financial regulators to
continually monitor financial markets and the contracts
market participants use to hedge risks and engage in
99
The Financial Stability Oversight Council
speculation.
100
is required to “monitor the financial services
(Council)
marketplace in order to identify potential threats to the
101
financial stability of the United States”; to take into account
“the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness,
102
and mix of the activities” of a nonbank financial institution
when determining whether the institution should be subject to
96

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C.,
12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
97
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(1),
(a)(4)(A) (defining “bank holding company” and “foreign nonbank financial company,”
respectively); id. § 102(a)(4)(D) (defining “nonbank financial company supervised by the
Board of Governors” as a nonbank financial company that the Financial Stability
Oversight Council has determined shall be supervised by the Board of Governors); id.
§ 102(a)(7) (delegating to the Federal Reserve Board the authority to define “significant
nonbank financial companies” and “significant bank holding companies”).
98
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 3 (summarizing the testimony of Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke to the Banking Committee on July 22, 2009).
99
See Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII, Subtitle A—Regulation of Over-the-Counter
Swap Markets; Subtitle B—Regulation of Security-Based Swap Markets; Title VIII—
Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision; Title IX, Subtitle D—Improvements to
the Asset-Backed Securitization Process.
100
See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 111-112 (establishing the Financial Stability
Oversight Council and setting forth authority).
101
Id. § 112(a)(2)(C).
102
Id. § 113(a)(2)(G).

1464

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4
103

enhanced supervision by the Federal Reserve;
and to
determine whether it should restrict an institution’s ability to
offer particular financial products or to require the institution
to terminate risky activities (or, alternatively, to impose
104
conditions on the manner in which it carries them out).
This is a difficult task, even in the best possible
scenario, an idealized world in which regulators and regulated
parties have identical interests and combine forces to identify
and resolve problems, in a spirit of cooperation. The task,
however, becomes increasingly difficult in a regulatory context,
such as that of modern financial markets, in which financial
institutions compete with each other to identify and exploit
legal loopholes, and where the avant-garde financial engineer
gets compensated more handsomely than the “retro-garde” risk
manager. But even in the idealized regulatory context, the
Council and Federal Reserve would need to identify growing
system-wide risks in a timely fashion. And once they have done
that, they must find and implement a solution before a systemwide problem has tipped over into systemic risk, and triggered
a financial crisis.
The financial health of an individual financial
institution can change quickly, insidiously, and sometimes
catastrophically, as in the case of a bank run. New financial
contracts (or types of transactions) that work perfectly under
normal parameters, or when used sparingly, can change
quickly into toxic assets due to unforeseeable contingencies.
Real-time governance by regulators of individual financial
institutions and financial contracts is a difficult, complex
undertaking; real-time governance of financial systems—an
agglomeration of institutions and financial contracts—is
exponentially more difficult. And not just for regulators, but for
shareholders, creditors, managers, and counterparties in
financial contracts.
It follows that the macroprudential oversight that the
Council and Federal Reserve are charged with is a far more
daunting task than the microprudential (single-institution)
approach under traditional banking regulations. The first step
in achieving real-time macroprudential regulation is that of
gathering large amounts of information, processing it
(including aggregating it into manageable data sets), testing it,
103

See id. § 113(a)(1) (allowing the Council to vote to require enhanced
supervision with Federal Reserve of U.S. nonbank financial institutions).
104
See id. § 121(a).
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analyzing the results, and transferring them to the right
regulator, in a usable format, so that it can understand and use
105
them, before the information has become stale. Again, the
task is not an easy one: information about dynamic
environments, such as financial markets, will remain fresh—
accurate and usable—for much shorter periods than that about
more static environments in other industries. To help in this
endeavor, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new Office of
106
Financial Research.
Of critical importance for purposes of this article is the
question of how one goes about characterizing interconnections
between financial institutions. The Council has defined
“interconnectedness” of financial institutions to mean the
“direct or indirect linkages . . . that may be conduits for the
transmission of the effects” of a financial institution’s “material
107
financial distress or activities.” But there is still no adequate
account of how direct and indirect linkages between financial
institutions and financial contracts can lead to the spillover of
counterparty risk discussed below. Moreover, and somewhat
problematically, Dodd-Frank draws a relatively sharp
distinction between the regulation of systemically important
108
financial contracts and financial
financial institutions,
109
110
markets, and clearing and settlement facilities.
B.

Transitive-Risk Contracts

A transitive-risk contract relationship involves two or
more contracts that are linked together by the participation of
a common party, which I will refer to as the conduit. As a
general matter, a transitive relation between the members of a
set, A, B, and C, meets the following condition: if A and B are
in relation R to each other, and B and C are in a relation R,

105

See Ben Kao et al., Updates and View Maintenance in Soft Real-Time
Database Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (CIKM) 300, 300-01 (1999)
(distinguishing between “transaction timeliness”—how fast a system carries out a
requested transaction—and data “timeliness”—which refers to the relative freshness or
staleness of data).
106
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 151-156.
107
Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 64264, 64279 (proposed Oct. 18, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. tit. 1310).
108
See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 113, 115, 161-176 and Title II.
109
See id. Title VII.
110
See id. Title VIII.
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then A and C are also in a relation R to each other.111 In the
case of transitive-risk contracting, both A and B and B and C
are in contractual relationships with each other. We can thus
say that A and C are in an indirect contracting relationship,
through B, who acts as the conduit. The conduit brings
together two external parties within a common contracting
sphere, where they can influence the other’s welfare, for better
or worse. The conduit, in short, is a vehicle through which the
two external parties can transmit positive and negative
externalities to each other. Whenever two parties enter into a
contract, their actions under the contract may create costs or
benefits to third parties who are not party to the contract.112 For
example, a contract between a homeowner and a contractor to
effectuate extensive renovations to the outside of her home may
create negative externalities to her neighbors during the
renovations, but it may also produce positive externalities to
the extent it increases neighboring property values. This
standard type of externality problem has received a large
amount of attention in the legal literature.113 However, this
article focuses not on general externality problems but instead
on the way that one particular class of externalities—contract
risks—are created and transferred in multiparty transactions.
So far we have assumed that the transitive-risk
relationships involve three parties, but they can involve more
parties. For example, suppose a company has 100 short-term
and 10 long-term creditors. One could model this relationship
as involving 110 creditors, all linked together by the
corporation (the conduit). Or, depending on the context, we
could model it as a three-party relationship, with the shortterm and long-term creditors, as a group, linked together by
the corporation. One would take the first approach if, for
example, one were concerned with the way that cross-default
provisions link all the creditors together. One would take the
second approach, however, if one were concerned about the
counterparty risks borne by long-term creditors in the event
111

See, e.g., Edi Karni & David Schmeidler, Utility Theory with Uncertainty,
in IV HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1763, 1766 (W. Hildenbrand & H.
Sonnenschein, eds. 1991) (defining a transitive relation as one in which, given a binary
relation ≥ , on a set A, the relation is transitive, if for all a, b, and c, in A, if a ≥ b & b ≥
c, then a ≥ c).
112
See James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29
ECONOMICA 371, 371 (1962) (defining externality).
113
For an overview of the standard externality theory see RICHARD CORNES &
TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 39142 (2d ed. 1996).
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short-term creditors, as a group, were to withdraw their
financing, increase the interest rate of their loans, or require
the corporation to pledge additional collateral. All other things
being equal, the greater the number of simple contracts
combined into a composite, transitive-risk contract, the greater
the complexity and thus, time, it would take parties to
understand the myriad interconnections.
C.

Transitive Counterparty Risk

Transitive-risk contract relationships raise a number of
important informational problems that might be overlooked if
one failed to fully account for the role the conduit party plays in
transmitting and obscuring information about the various
external parties. An external party may not know about the
existence of other external parties, and even if they know they
exist, they may not know their identity or have the capacity to
observe their behavior. For example, as we will see below,
while depositors know that their collective contractual
relationships with a bank binds them together in a special way,
they also know that they lack complete information about each
of their private relationships with the bank. These two facts
can increase the likelihood of a bank run. Finally, in some
instances, confidentiality and anonymity make all of the
parties better off.114
It is helpful to specify the various ways in which
counterparty risks can be transmitted through transitive-risk
contracting relationships. First, suppose that A and B enter
into a contract in which they are both subject to a counterparty
risk vis-à-vis the other, and B and C enter into an analogous
contract in which they both bear counterparty risks. It follows
that A and C are in a transitive-risk relationship, where B is a
conduit for the transmission of counterparty risks. Suppose
that A breaches on its contract with B. In that instance, C’s
counterparty risk will increase due to the greater likelihood
that B may need to breach its contract with C. A breach by C
could increase A’s counterparty risk in the same manner.
114

A transaction between an external party and the conduit is confidential
vis-à-vis another external party if that party is not aware of the transaction. On the
other hand, in an anonymous transaction, the external party knows that the conduit
has entered into a transaction with another external party but does not know the
identity of that party. See Marc Rennhard et al., An Architecture for an Anonymity
Network, 2001 IEEE 165, 166 (developing distinction between confidentiality and
anonymity in the context of network security protocols).
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Second, suppose there are three contracts, each
involving one-sided counterparty risks: (1) A to B; (2) B to C;
and (3) C to D. If A breaches its contract with B, both C and D
may be negatively affected.

This last example could include a larger number of
parties linked through a series of transitive-risk contracts. This
is important because the decisional complexity facing the
parties is likely to increase with each additional link in a
transitive-risk contracting chain, and a greater amount of
information is likely to be lost along the way.
IV.

TRANSITIVE-RISK CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS

Transitive-risk contracts are particularly important in
financial transactions because of the frequent involvement of
financial institutions acting as financial intermediaries.115 This
part analyzes the role of transitive-risk contracts in a number
of contexts involving financial institutions. It begins by
examining transitive-risk contracts in commercial banking,
and identifies transitive counterparty risks flowing from
depositors to borrowers and vice versa, as well as transitive
risks among depositors. The following section extends the
general insights to show how transitive counterparty risks can
fuel bank panics and financial contagion. The part continues by
115

Because of the coordination problems involved in many types of financial
intermediation contexts, it is useful to model financial intermediation relationship as a
multi-party relationship, as opposed to two or more independent financial contracts
tied together by the fact that there is a common intermediary involved. See Martin F.
Hellwig, Financial Intermediation and Risk Aversion, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 719, 719-20
(2000) (arguing that we should model intermediation as a relation between
intermediaries, the investors providing the funds and the firms making use of these
intermediated funds, and complaining that many studies fail to approach the two sets
of financial contracts in a holistic fashion).
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analyzing transitive-risk contracts in repo transactions. In
doing so it identifies transitive counterparty risks among repo
borrowers as well as transitive risks flowing from the
financiers of repo lenders to repo borrowers and vice versa. The
part then looks at transitive counterparty risks in
securitization transactions. It then provides a more general
account of how transitive-risk contracts can exacerbate
liquidity problems among financial institutions. The last
section analyzes transitive counterparty risks in derivative
contracting contexts.
A.

Transitive-Risk Contracts Between Depositors, a Bank,
and the Bank’s Borrowers

Commercial banks finance their operations primarily by
borrowing from their depositors on a short-term basis. A
demand deposit agreement is structured so deposits will roll
over automatically, daily, until the depositor terminates all or
part of the loan by making a withdrawal.116 A bank aggregates
the depositors’ funds, keeps some on reserve to satisfy
anticipated withdrawals, and lends the rest. While a bank can
choose the maturity of its loans to third parties, it cannot
demand early repayment, unless the borrower has defaulted.117
This tripartite relationship between banks, its shortterm lenders (the depositors), and its long-term borrowers
exposes a bank to the maturity mismatch problem discussed in
Part I. This section examines that problem in greater detail,
using the transitive-risk contract theory developed in Part III.
It begins by analyzing the transitive counterparty risk
associated with the relationship between depositors and
borrowers. A maturity-mismatch problem can arise if a
sufficient number of depositors decide to make withdrawals at
the same time, or whenever a large enough group of borrowers
default on their obligations to the bank within a short period of
time. In other words, a bank can become insolvent or face a
liquidity problem whenever its loan portfolio loses a sufficient
116

See Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable
Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND
THE MACROECONOMY: MODELS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 36-41 (providing
an overview of demand deposits and their role in providing liquidity to depositors).
117
Some loan agreements will include “insecurity clauses” that allow banks to
accelerate payment of the principal and interest due, but if the debt is secured by
collateral subject to Article 9 of the UCC, then the acceleration will be allowed if the
creditor “in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired.” See UCC § 1-309 (2011).
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amount of value or if depositors and other lenders refuse to roll
over their loans. The section then examines the transfer of
transitive counterparty risk among depositors.
1. Transitive-Risk Contracts Between Depositors and
Borrowers, with the Bank as Conduit
In order to manage its liquidity risks, a bank must
predict the expected inflow and outflow of deposits and loan
proceeds. A bank’s credit risk refers to the likelihood that the
expected returns from its loan portfolio will fail to materialize
due to borrowers’ defaults.118 In order to properly account for it,
a bank must anticipate outside shocks that could negatively
impact its borrower base—both current and potential
borrowers. These include shifts in the business cycle119 and
declines in the value of collateral, such as real estate,
equipment, securities, and inventory.120
The demand deposit contracts between depositors and a
bank create a positive externality for borrowers, given that it is
the depositors’ cash that funds the loan contracts. In a similar
fashion, loan agreements create a positive externality for
depositors: the bank will use a portion of the interest from
these loans to pay depositors interest on their accounts.

But this transitive relation can also lead to the transfer
of counterparty risk from borrowers to depositors and vice
versa, with the bank, again, acting as the conduit. If enough
borrowers default on their loans or take their business to
another institution, the value of the bank’s assets and its cash
118

See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (OCC), ASSET SECURITIZATION:
COMPTROLLERS HANDBOOK 37 (Nov. 1997) (defining credit risk as the “risk to earnings
or capital arising from an obligor’s failure to meet the terms of any contract with the
bank or otherwise to perform as agreed”).
119
See Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of The Basel
II Capital Standards, ECON. PERSPECTIVES 18, 21 (1st Q., 2004) (arguing that instead
of setting capital requirements based on a single, static risk curve, regulators should
instead use “a family of point-in-time risk curves, with each curve corresponding . . . to
different macroeconomic conditions”).
120
See Mark H. Adelson & David P. Jacobs, The Subprime Problem; Causes
and Lessons, 14 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 12 (2008).
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flows would be negatively affected. This, in turn, would
increase the counterparty risk faced by depositors, who may be
unable to withdraw their funds if the bank becomes insolvent
or experiences a liquidity problem. At the same time, if enough
depositors withdraw their funds, they create a transitive
counterparty risk for borrowers, to the extent that it leads the
bank to breach commitments on revolving loan agreements121 or
to cut back on its lending activities, thereby affecting borrowers
with more short-term loans who cannot renew them.122
2. Transitive-Risk Contracts Among Depositors, with
the Bank as Conduit
As we just saw, each depositor is in a contractual
relationship with the bank and thus is subject to the risk that
the bank will breach its obligation to return the funds on
demand. In addition, each depositor is in a transitive-risk
relationship with each other depositor, with the bank as a
conduit.
This
“hub-and-spoke”
transitive
contracting
relationship among depositors can lead to the transfer of
positive externalities as well as counterparty risk.

Whenever a depositor rolls over its deposits for an
additional period, it provides a positive externality to other
depositors; if the other depositors do the same, they all benefit
from continuing the status quo equilibrium. If, on the other
hand, a depositor closes its account it creates a counterparty
risk for other depositors; while this risk may be small if only a
handful of depositors withdraw their funds, it can over time
increase in magnitude, given the transitive-risk relationship
between depositors and borrowers. As depositors withdraw
funds, a bank will have to cut-back on its lending activities or
make less profitable short-term loans. This in turn can lead a
bank to reduce the interest that it pays on its deposit accounts,
which can increase the likelihood that depositors will move
121

In a revolving loan agreement, a bank agrees to lend funds to a borrower
whenever the borrower chooses to draw down on the loan.
122
See supra note 53.
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their funds to another bank. These feedback loops play an
important role in financial contracts involving financial
intermediaries; the transitive-risk contracting model allows us
to bring them to the foreground and provides a
straightforward, intuitive way of identifying the types of
relationships in which transitive counterparty risks can
produce a quickly destructive transitive-risk-feedback loop. A
bank run is one such transitive-loop.
A bank run occurs whenever depositors suddenly
withdraw their funds based on a belief that, if they delay, the
bank will run out of cash.123 As a general matter, a bank run
will occur whenever a sufficiently large number of depositors124
believes that the bank is in financial trouble due to a reduction
in liquidity, a deterioration of its loan portfolio, or the
possibility that the bank is otherwise in danger of becoming
insolvent.125 But what ultimately causes bank runs is the fact
that depositors are in a transitive-risk relationship with each
other, they know about the relationship, and they have
incomplete information about why some depositors have chosen

123

See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 16, at 401 (defining a bank run as a
situation in which “depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the
bank to fail”). Bank runs are often triggered by depositors’ herding behavior. For
example, suppose a bank has three depositors. Depositor 1 withdraws her money from
the bank. Depositor 2, after observing this, follows suit, believing that Depositor 1
acted on private information that the bank was insolvent. Now Depositor 3, after
observing the behavior of the first two depositors, is even more likely to believe they
acted on the basis of useful private information about the bank’s financial condition.
Depositor 2 and Depositor 3, however, do not know whether Depositor 1 withdrew
funds because it needed cash—for example, because it needed to pay its taxes—or
because it knew the bank was in financial trouble. This informational asymmetry
between depositors can lead to inefficient herding, whereby otherwise healthy banks
suffer bank runs. A bank run might be triggered when uninformed depositors observe
longer-than-usual lines of depositors withdrawing funds or when false rumors begin
circulating that a bank is facing financial trouble. See V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan,
Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium, in CREDIT,
INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY: MODELS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note
31, at 265-79 (offering a bank run model in which a sufficiently large set of individuals
withdraw at the same time for private reasons not necessarily related, and these
withdrawers are observed by others that infer that those withdrawals are due to
liquidity problems in that bank).
124
To the extent that a sophisticated depositor’s funds comprise a sufficiently
large portion of a bank’s deposit, the possibility of a bank run may depend on the
decision of the large depositor to stay put or pull its funds out of the bank. See TIROLE,
supra note 7, at 456 (stating that if large depositors are patient then bank runs may be
averted, even if small depositors begin to withdraw funds).
125
See Charles J. Jacklin & Sudipto Bhattacharya, Distinguishing Panics and
Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications, 96 J. POL ECON. 568 (1988).
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to withdraw their funds.126 Bank withdrawals occur on a “firstcome, first-served” basis, which creates a race to the withdrawal
window.127 As a result, if a depositor has any doubt regarding
whether a bank run is about to begin or has already begun, she
has ample incentive to withdraw her money immediately instead
of trying to ascertain the motives of other depositors or to make
sense of the bank’s complex financial condition.
Bank runs could be avoided altogether by bringing in an
additional counterparty to insure deposits—such as the
FDIC—or replacing the fractional reserve system with a
system in which banks must keep 100 percent of their deposits
on reserve.128 Of course, such a bank would have to limit its
business to “storing” deposits or would need to raise capital from
other sources, such as by issuing equity or long-term debt.129
The transitive-risk contract model allows us to better
understand the relationship between these two approaches. In
the case of an outside insurer, one is merely replacing one type
of transitive-risk relationship with another. The FDIC now
stands in the shoes of depositors, so it will be in a transitive
relationship with the bank’s borrowers. As such the bank will
act as a conduit to transfer counterparty risks between the
FDIC and borrowers: if borrowers default on their loans,
depositors may trigger a bank run, and the FDIC will bear the
loss. Similarly, if the FDIC determines that the bank should
keep higher reserves and thus cut back on its lending
activities, the bank’s borrowers would be affected. Under the
second approach, in which the bank is required to keep 100
percent of deposits on reserve, one is merely severing the
transitive counterparty risk relationship between depositors
and borrowers, but creating a functionally equivalent transitive
relationship between borrowers and the holders of the bank’s
equity and debt securities. Both types of solutions to bank runs
are just ways of changing the identity of the parties who are in
126

See BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 63, at 28 (drawing distinction between
traders who sell assets due to own private reasons and those who sell for common
reasons, such as private information that the assets are over-valued).
127
See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 16, at 403 (model in which bank run
occurs due to liquid liabilities and illiquid assets and the sequential nature in which
depositors must withdraw funds; depositors will have an incentive to be the first to withdraw).
128
See Jean-Charles Rochet, Bank Runs and Financial Crises: A Discussion,
in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY supra note 31, at 324-25 (arguing
that fractional reserve system is principal reason for general fragility of banks).
129
See Biagio Bossone, Should Banks Be Narrowed? (Levy Institute Working
Paper No. 354), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp354.pdf (discussing
the concept of “narrow banks” which do not rely on depositors’ funds).

1474

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

a transitive contracting relationship with each other. The
transitive-risk contracting model, therefore, offers a deeper
account of bank runs and potential policy solutions. As we will
see in the rest of the article, it also helps us to better
understand the dynamics of bank panics, financial contagion,
and “runs” in shadow banks.
B.

Bank Panics and Financial Contagion

A bank panic occurs when the failure of one bank leads
to the failure of a large number of banks, possibly affecting the
whole industry;130 problems within the banking system can spill
over to other financial institutions, financial markets, and
currency markets (problems within any of those markets can
also spread to other parts of the financial system). This sort of
intra-system spillover comes under the rubric of financial
contagion.131 Both bank panics and financial contagion can be
explained using the transitive-risk contracting model.
Banks are in a transitive contracting relationship with
each other, through which positive externalities and negative
counterparty risk gets transmitted. One type of transitive
contract linkage stems from the fact that banks routinely lend
money to each other through the interbank lending system.132
The interbank lending system provides a positive externality to
those involved, since it allows banks to withstand outside
shocks or address liquidity needs created by the random ebb
and flow of deposits and withdrawals.133 At the same time, it
can act as a conduit for the transfer of transitive counterparty
risk: financial problems within one or more participating banks
can lead other banks to hoard cash and cut-back on their
lending activities.134 This in turn can have a transitive-risk-

130

See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 191-92 (distinguishing between a
“bank run” affecting one bank and a “bank panic” affecting the whole banking industry).
131
See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL.
ECON. 1, 2 (2000) (describing contagion across different parts of financial system).
132
See Rochet, supra note 128, at 329-34 (describing linkages through
interbank lending and payment systems and discussing reasons why these
interconnections can increase the likelihood of contagion).
133
See João F. Cocco, Lending Relationships in the Interbank Market, 18 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 24, 25-26 (2009) (summarizing literature on use of interbank
lending to meet liquidity needs).
134
See Allen & Gale, Financial Contagion, 3-5 (arguing that interbank
markets help decrease the probability of individual bank failure, but increases
likelihood of financial contagion).
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feedback effect that can lead the whole market to freeze, as it
did at the beginning of the Great Recession.135
Depositors in different banks within a financial system
are in a transitive-risk relationship with each other; these
interconnections can help explain bank panics. Depositors of
Bank A could interpret the failure of Bank B in two ways: as a
problem unique to that bank, or as a problem affecting all
banks within the system, such as nonperforming loan portfolios
or a decrease in the value of investment securities.136 If
depositors conclude that the problem is attributable to systemwide problems, they will stage bank runs in each of their
institutions, thereby producing a full-fledged panic.137
C.

Transitive-Risk Contracts in the Repo Market
1. Repos

The repo market is a principal source of financing for
financial institutions; it enables them to raise short-term funds
by using securities as collateral.138 A repo transaction is
functionally equivalent to a short-term secured loan. It involves
two contracts: under the first one, a “lender” purchases, at a
discount, a security, which will act as a form of “collateral”;139
under the second contract, the “borrower” agrees to repurchase
the security, at a price higher than what it sold it to the
lender.140 The difference between the sale and repurchase prices
135

See Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the
Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 57-58 (2009)
(stating that interbank lending among U.S. banks is $2 trillion and that hoarding of
funds in this market was one of the triggers of the Great Recession); Jean-Charles
Rochet & Jean Tirole, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT, &
BANKING 733, 734-35 (1996) (arguing that interbank lending will provide incentive to
monitor and that this incentive will tend to decrease to the extent that governments
insure these loans).
136
See Philippe Aghion et al., Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking
System, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 713, 715-17 (2000) (developing a global coordination
failure model of contagion in which the failure of one bank can lead depositors to
conclude that failure is due to liquidity problems in banking system as a whole).
137
See Rochet, supra note 128, at 328-29 (describing global coordination
failures in financial markets analogous to a single institution coordination problem).
138
See Peter Hordahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets
During the Financial Turmoil, BIS Q. REV. 37, 38-39 (Dec. 2008) (describing basic
characteristics and uses of repo transactions).
139
The collateral may range from relatively safe and liquid securities (such as
T-bills) to much riskier ones (such as asset-backed securities).
140
A repo seller owning a security valued at $1000 can sell it to the repo buyer
for $900, agreeing to repurchase it at a later date for $1000. The $100 difference
between the sale and repurchase price is the haircut, equivalent to a cash margin but
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is equivalent to the interest that would have been paid on a
standard loan. If the borrower breaches by refusing to
repurchase the collateral, the lender will sell the collateral.141
Although this may mitigate the lender’s damages, it still bears
the risk that the value of the collateral will go down or that it
will be unable to resell it.
The repo market represents a principal source of
secured financing for shadow banks, and it has become an
increasingly important part of financing for traditional banks,
as well. In fact, by the end of 2007, the repo market was larger
than the total assets of the U.S. banking system142 and provided
a principal source of funds for investment banks, hedge funds,
and traditional banks. Indeed, in the period leading to the
Great Recession, U.S. investment banks used the repo market
for approximately fifty percent of their funding needs.143
2. Transitive Contracts Among Repo Lenders, and
Shadow-Bank Runs
As we have seen, bank runs occur whenever depositors
stop “rolling over their deposits” en masse. By analogy, a
shadow-bank run can be defined as the sudden withdrawal of
short-term financing from a shadow bank. Repo lenders are in
a transitive contracting relationship with each other, with the
borrower acting as a conduit. Repo lenders may stop rolling
over their repos because they believe that the borrower may be
unable to meet its repurchase obligations or that there has
been a material decline in the value of the collateral; they may
is, in fact, higher, because the collateral may lose value before the repurchase date. On
that date, the parties can either settle or roll over the repo.
141
The transaction is structured as a sale for bankruptcy purposes. If the
borrower goes into bankruptcy during the term of the repo, the collateral does not
become part of the bankruptcy estate, since the lender already owns it. See, e.g.,
William F. Hagerty, IV, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty over the Repo Market:
Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 401, 409 (1984) (noting that characterizing a repo transaction as a purchase
rather than a loan protects the collateral from the bankruptcy trustee). This is
different than if the transaction had been structured as a loan secured by the security.
See Bankruptcy Code § 559, 11 U.S.C. § 559 (2006) (exempting repos from the
automatic stay); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (exempting the applicability of stays to exercise
of contractual rights by a repo participant).
142
See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run
on Repo 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15223, 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15223 (estimating that at the end of 2007,
the size of the repo market and bank assets was approximately $12 trillion and $10
trillion, respectively).
143
See Hördhal & King, supra note 137, at 38.

2013]

TRANSITIVE COUNTERPARTY RISK

1477

also stop rolling over a repo if they themselves are experiencing
a liquidity shortage or other financial problem. As in the case of
depositors, a repo lender who sees a second lender failing to
renew its repo may not know if it is due to private information
that it has about the borrower or because of its own financial
needs. This informational asymmetry between repo lenders can
lead to a run on a borrower.
The transitive-contracting problem is more complex in
repos than in bank-depositor transactions. First, while depositors
can withdraw their funds at any time, a repo lender commits to
relinquishing its funds to the borrower for the entire term of the
loan (its “exposure interval”), which can range anywhere from
overnight to a year or more. As a result, in order to decide
whether to roll over a repo, a lender must try to predict what
other repo lenders and long-term lenders will do during its
exposure interval. Second, depositors in a well-diversified pool are
unlikely to withdraw their funds simultaneously because they are
all experiencing a liquidity problem. On the other hand, repo
lenders and those who provide financing to them—hedge funds,
investment banks, bank holding companies, and other
institutional investors—are more likely to experience liquidity
and other financial problems at the same time, particularly in the
midst of macroeconomic shocks or financial crises.144 As a result,
repo borrowers are in a transitive risk relationship with those
who provide funds to its repo lenders (the “repo-lender
financiers”). If the repo-lender financiers withdraw their funding,
repo borrowers will inherit the counterparty risk. Similarly, if
repo borrowers fail to meet their obligations, the repo-lender
financiers will inherit the transitive counterparty risk.

3. The Transitive-Risk Problem and Repo Collateral
Repo borrowers often use securities from their portfolios to
secure their repos. Thus, a decline in the value of those securities
can lead a repo lender to withdraw its funding, since it would be
144

See Lo, supra note 62, at 35 (discussing the risk related to correlated needs
among those supplying and demanding liquidity).
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an indication that the borrower’s overall portfolio may have lost
value. Repo lenders will either request additional collateral or
require that the borrower take a bigger haircut on the repo. In
either case, the borrower will face a potential liquidity problem
and will be forced to operate with a lower amount of leverage.
This, in turn, may place it at a disadvantage in relation to other
borrowers that can achieve a greater amount of leverage.145
Moreover, since repo borrowers often use the same securities as
collateral—e.g., the same type of mortgage-backed securities—a
decline in the value of these securities can expose repo borrowers
to transitive counterparty risk from other repo borrowers. In
other words, even if a repo borrower is doing well financially, the
fact that similarly situated borrowers are doing poorly may lead
repo lenders to withdraw their funding.
To see the nature of this transitive counterparty risk
among repo borrowers, suppose that two borrowers are dealing
with the same repo lender, using the same collateral, and that
one of them defaults on its repo agreement. In order to salvage
its investment, the lender would try to sell the collateral, which
would put downward pressure on its value. This, in turn, would
affect the “good” borrower’s ability to use that collateral when it
tries to roll over its repo. The problem is further exacerbated if the
“bad” borrower is shut out of the repo market and forced to sell
more of that same type of securities in the open market. Finally,
these sales may reveal a more accurate valuation of the securities
in question, which may require both types of borrowers to write
down the value of the asset on their balance sheets.
This type of scenario was exactly what occurred in the
repo markets beginning in August 2007, as lenders—worried
about the declining value of the mortgage-backed securities
that secured countless repo transactions—began to impose
higher haircuts and require safer, more liquid securities, such
as T-Bills.146 In fact, the haircut on some classes of asset-backed
securities rose to 100 percent; in other words, they were no
longer accepted as collateral.147

145

One of the reasons why shadow banks have a competitive advantage over
traditional banks is that banking regulations limit the amount of leverage that a bank
can undertake. See Lo, supra note 62, at 4.
146
See Gorton, supra note 65, at 35-36.
147
Id.
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Transitive-Risk Contracting and Securitization

Securitization helps reduce the liquidity risks of lenders
and provides them with funds to originate new loans.148 In a
typical securitization transaction, one party (the originator)
forms a special purpose vehicle (SPV), usually a trust, and sells
it a pool of illiquid assets. In order to pay for the assets, the
SPV sells securities that entitle the holders to receive part of
the income stream produced by those assets. The securities are
marketed to sophisticated investors, such as pension funds,
hedge funds, mutual funds, and sovereign funds.149
In order to reduce the risk that securitized assets pose
to purchasers, the originator will either contract with a third
party to provide a credit enhancement—that is, insurance—or
structure the SPV in a way that will act as a form of internal
insurance. Originators use two general techniques to provide
this internal insurance. First, they may over-collateralize the
SPV; that way, if some debtors default on their obligations, the
additional collateral will cover part of the losses. Second,
originators may use a capital structure for the SPV that
stratifies the risk to investors.150 One common structure divides
the securities into senior and junior tranches, so that the junior
securities will be the first to absorb any losses. Moreover,
prepayments made by debtors of the securitized assets will be
distributed first to the senior security holders.151
The types of assets used in these transactions include
home and commercial mortgages, consumer loans, student
loans, credit-card and automobile receivables, and other types of
assets that will produce a stream of cash over time.152
Traditionally, lenders held onto these assets and received the
income stream as debtors repaid the principal and interest on
their loans. But lenders also retained the risk that some of these
payments would not materialize—that is, that some of the loans
would not be repaid and would need to be written down.

148

See Brunnermeier, supra note 65, at 82 (describing use of securitization by
lenders to sell illiquid assets in order to get funds that they can use to create additional
loans or meet other liquidity needs).
149
See Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and
Securitization, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 560-65 (Mark Carey &
René M. Stulz eds., 2007) (providing overview of securitization process).
150
See Gorton, supra note 65, at 19-20.
151
Id.
152
See Brunnermeier, supra note 65, at 78-79.
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Securitization, however, allows a lender to sell the right
to receive the future income stream from its loan portfolio to
third parties. This has three principal advantages. First, the
lender shifts the risk of owning the assets to buyers who, in
theory, are better positioned to bear the risk. Second, the
lender recognizes income immediately and can finance new
loans, without having to raise additional short-term financing
or, in the case of a commercial bank, grow its depositor base.153
This, in turn, allows lenders to shift large portions of their
business to off-balance-sheet transactions.154 Third, by shifting
the risk of nonperforming loans to purchasers and transforming
its loan portfolio into cash, a lender can reduce the risk of an
assets-liabilities mismatch of the sort that plagued banks
before the introduction of deposit insurance.
It is helpful to examine the transitive-risk contracting
relationships involved in mortgage-backed securities. If
borrowers breach their residential mortgage loans with a bank,
the counterparty risks of depositors increase; if those loans
have been turned into mortgage-backed securities, the
counterparty risks of the holders of those securities will
increase. Since the originator will keep some of those mortgagebacked securities to use as collateral for repo transactions, the
repo purchasers holding those securities will inherit some of
the increased counterparty risk that was first set in motion
when the residential mortgage borrowers defaulted on their
loans.

Suppose that a lending institution or originator has
built a loan portfolio and that the demand for that particular
type of loan has subsided. The originator will either be required
to keep the loans on its books or sell them at a discount. If it
failed to anticipate this change in the market, then the
153

See Tirole, supra note 10, at 299 n.17.
Because banks are required to meet certain capitalization requirements,
they will have an incentive to securitize loans in order to meet such requirements. This
means that as banks face financial difficulties, they will have an incentive to securitize
even more of these loans in order to meet the capitalization requirements. See OCC,
supra note 118, at 4 (stating that by securitizing loans, banks can remove assets from
balance sheets in a manner that allows them to raise more funds on on-balance sheet
transactions).
154
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originator may face a liquidity problem. Indeed, if it was
depending on the proceeds from that sale to meet its
repurchase obligation under the repo contract and defaults,
then the repo lender will keep the collateral and sell it. But the
transitive counterparty risk will also flow in the opposite
direction. Defaults by the originator can lead repo lenders to
curb their lending which in turn may lead to higher interest
rates on mortgages, and a reduction in the demand for home
purchases. The transitive-risk contracting model again
captures a transitive-counterparty risk feedback loop; it is a
loop that can fuel asset bubbles in good times and lead to sharp
retrenchments when the bubble bursts.
It is helpful to examine the incentives of loan
originators to package loans strategically, thereby exacerbating
the transitive risk problem. Suppose that an originator holding
a loan portfolio categorizes its loans into three types: good,
neutral, and bad. The originator knows it can sell the good
loans and the neutral loans (but only if they are combined with
some good loans). If it believes that it will have access to good
loans in the future, it may decide to sell the good loans first,
since they will provide the highest return. It will then use the
funds from the sale to buy additional loans, and it will combine
the good loans with the neutral ones. As long as a sufficient
supply of good loans remains, the originator will continue to
securitize. But, if the originator senses that the supply of good
loans is diminishing, it will begin adding some neutral loans
into the mix. Doing so, however, will yield a lower return and
make it more difficult to bid for good loans that are in short
supply and thus more expensive. At some point, the originator
will be left with only bad and neutral loans. Left with few
options, it will be tempted to package and sell them off, since
this will give it an option value; it will be able to delay its
financial reckoning, in the hopes that things will get better.
But, over time, ratings agencies will prevent the originator
from pursuing this strategy. It will become common knowledge
that the market is in trouble and that outstanding assetbacked securities are worth less than thought. By this point,
the originator will hold a portfolio of relatively bad loans that
cannot be packaged and sold.
E.

Liquidity and Transitive Counterparty Relationships

Financial institutions are linked through a number of
contractual transactions involving derivative securities, such as
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interest rate swaps, exchange rate derivatives, mortgage-backed
securities, and a number of other types of exotic financial
instruments.155 Counterparties must remain solvent in order to
perform their end of the bargain at the allotted time. A failure by
one of these counterparties can lead to a default, which may
require the promisee to readjust its securities portfolio or sell
assets to meet the obligations that would have been covered by
the counterparty. The next section will examine other transitive
counterparty risks involving complex derivatives. This section will
focus on how transitive contracting relationships can lead to the
transfer of liquidity risks across institutions.
One institution’s failure can cause liquidity problems for
other institutions, and this systemic liquidity problem can cause
financial markets to freeze up. Financial institutions often act
both as borrowers and lenders, making a profit on the difference
between what they have to pay to borrow funds and what they
charge for their borrowers. When systemically important
institutions fail, they will no longer be able to lend or borrow
funds, a transitive counterparty risk that is transmitted to other
institutions, even if they did not transact regularly with the
failing institutions. In other words, when institutions fail, other
institutions may reason that both their lenders and borrowers
may enter into fewer transactions with them. This will in turn
affect their cash flows both on the funding and supply sides.
Fearing a liquidity crunch, institutions therefore will have an
incentive to protect themselves by hoarding liquid assets—that is,
by not lending. If they are afraid that other institutions will start
selling securities from their portfolio, they will have an incentive
to sell those securities first, which may lead to a fire-sale.156
Moreover, a decision to sell a particular security will send a signal
to the market about the value of the seller’s security portfolio.
Given the adverse selection problem,157 it is more likely that bad
155

See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 135, at 733 (describing transactional
interconnections, particularly through over-the-counter traded derivatives).
156
See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of England, Speech: Rethinking
the Financial Network (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf
(describing dynamic in which financial institutions with risky assets engaged in
liquidity hoarding and fire-sale of assets, and analogizing their response to the common
reaction of people to outbreak of epidemic).
157
See Guillermo Calvo, Capital Market Contagion and Recession: An
Explanation of the Russian Virus, in WANTED: WORLD FINANCIAL STABILITY 49, 50-51
(Eduardo Fernandez-Arias & Ricardo Hausmann eds., 2000) (arguing that during a
financial crisis buyers will face a market for “lemons” problem, in which they will
require discounts due to uncertainty about the assets’ value; when liquidity is needed
quickly, the affected institutions will have to sell their best assets first in a fire-sale).
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financial institutions will sell the better assets first in order to
send a deceptive signal to the market: that they are in a better
financial position than they really are.158 This will lead good
institutions to also sell their better assets first. If the liquidity
problems persist, the bad institutions will fail, and the good ones
will be left with securities portfolios containing poorly performing
securities. We can refer to this phenomenon as the “toxic-assettransitive risk” dynamic.
To see its full implications, suppose that a financial
institution has three types of assets: those at each extreme of
the good-to-bad spectrum, which can be easily identified as
such by a buyer, and those that are too complex or otherwise
too difficult to put into either category. The institution will be
unable to sell the bad assets unless it offers a steep discount,
but that would not yield enough cash to confront its pressing
liquidity problem. Moreover, the assets that are difficult to
categorize may require more time and due diligence to properly
value, but given the time constraints, the institution will have
an incentive to sell its most valuable assets first. The fact that
the institution is selling large amounts of good assets at the
same time may lead some market participants to conclude that
they are not good after all. And buyers will know that they
have a bargaining advantage, in light of the time constraint
faced by sellers during a liquidity crunch. Accordingly, potential
buyers will have incentive to delay in order to exacerbate the
problem and increase their bargaining advantage.
F.

Transitive-Risk Contracting and Complex Derivatives

The customers of modern financial intermediaries often
enter into very complex transactions with both intermediaries
and third parties. In doing so, they may rely on other
intermediaries such as rating agencies.159 As these
interconnections between parties increase in number and
complexity, the risks to all parties involved become harder to
understand and manage. This risk management problem is
exacerbated by the competition among intermediaries to
introduce financial products to exploit new markets. This, in turn,

158

For a discussion of the use of deceptive signaling, see Manuel A. Utset,
Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct as Securities Fraud, 54 B. C. L. REV. 645 (2013).
159
See Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, The Credit Rating
Game, 67 J. FIN. 85, 108-09 (2012) (summarizing literature on how issuers shop for
credit agencies in order to get favorable ratings and “exploit trusting investors”).
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leads to the introduction of increasingly specialized and complex
financial products, which are created on the fly by making slight
changes to previous securities. As a result, these new financial
products are usually sold to customers and “tested”
simultaneously.160 Untested and poorly understood investments
can quickly threaten the reliability of underlining risk
management systems. If these systems are not updated in a
timely fashion, they may give managers a false sense of security
and lead them to enter into transactions they would have avoided
had they known about the true extent of the existing risk.
These securities are often created by combining two or
more simpler contracts—or sets of promises—into a more
complex one, which is more difficult to understand and value.161
To deal with the valuation problem, parties use financial
models that are themselves highly complex and difficult to
verify—both ex ante and ex post—whether they are working
correctly.162 For example, suppose a financial manager has
identified a business problem, such as hedging a portfolio of
securities, managing foreign currency risks, or meeting
regulatory capitalization requirements. She will then choose an
appropriate model to reduce the problem’s overall complexity
and formulate a solution.163 The reliability of this solution will
depend on the robustness of the model’s assumptions.
In order to test the reliability and robustness of financial
models, financial firms turn to “quantitative experts” who use
computer simulations to predict how the models will play out in
the real world. One important part of this exercise is to create
160

One reason why investment banks may rush to market new financial
products is that once the products becomes public, other investment banks can copy
them and sell them to their own clients. Unlike standard innovations, getting effective
intellectual property protection of financial innovations is much more difficult. As a
result, the first investment bank to reach the market with a new product will be able to
acquire some market share and reputational capital before others copy its innovation.
See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 50-55
(1994). It is possible to get patent protection on some types of financial innovations. See
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(allowing patents on financial innovation to consolidate information flow among group of
mutual funds), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
161
See Merton, supra note 84, at 341 (describing aggregation of contracts to
form complex derivatives with new patterns of cash flows).
162
Firms, financial intermediaries, and regulators use financial models to
make sense of the complex, real-world environment in which financial decisions are
made and played out. See HO & LEE, supra note 4, at 8-9, 546-48 (describing use of
models to value securities, formulate trading strategies, and evaluate risk of trading
decisions in financial engineering, and in evaluating regulated financial companies).
163
See HO & LEE, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that models are developed to
solve specific financial problems).
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“stress tests,” in which a model’s standard assumptions are
replaced with ones involving extreme scenarios. In theory,
models that are not sufficiently robust to pass the stress test
will be replaced with better ones. But “better” models often
require a greater number of assumptions to better reflect realworld environments, which in turn increase the model’s
complexity. In the end, financial firms will be required to make
a number of tradeoffs, any of which increases the risk that they
will enter into a transaction with an incorrect understanding of
the myriad transitive-risk contractual relationships involved
and how to value and revalue them over time.
CONCLUSION
This article develops a new theory of financial contracts
and the interconnectedness of financial institutions. The theory
describes the role played by transitive-risk contractual
relationships where multiple parties are tied to each other,
directly or indirectly, through a series of interconnected contracts
(contracts within a contractual chain). Transitive-risk contracting
meshes well with our understanding of the factors that caused the
Great Recession and thus led to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank
Act. The Act requires financial regulators to adopt rules to reduce
the risk of future financial crises due to the interconnectedness of
financial institutions and the proliferation of complex financial
contracts whose true risk remains hidden from the parties to the
contract, other actors affected by those contracts, and financial
regulators. The transitive-risk contracting model provides
regulators with a way to identify problematic interconnections
between financial institutions, and to identify financial contracts
whose proliferation can lead to an increase in system-wide risk
and the potential of a financial crisis and financial contagion.

